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NOTE
RESTRICTIONS ON STOCK TRANSFER
"Small" or "closely held" business enterprises are frequently incorporated
for the purpose of limiting liability.' The recent amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, which permits shareholders of such corporations to elect
to be taxed as partnerships, serves as an added and even greater inducement
to incorporate since the undesirable "double taxation" feature is removed.2
It is of primary concern to shareholders of "closed" corporations that out-
side persons do not become stockholders, for conceivably a foreign intrusion
could jeopardize the enterprise's existence, as the close corporation and confi-
dence of the original incorporators might seriously be impaired.' Moreover it
is often desirable to maintain permanently the original proportion of stock held
by each stockholder, 4 and in light of Internal Revenue Code change the number
of stockholders must be limited in order to preserve the newly conferred tax
benefit. Therefore, it is usually advisable to effect some type of restriction on
the alienation of stock.' The unwary incorporators, however, in attempting
such restrictions can fall into a host of pitfalls erected by the courts, the legisla-
tors and the draftsman's lack of perception. This article is devoted to uncover-
ing some of these pitfalls.
Originally, stock restrictions were considered contrary to public policy be-
cause they hampered free transfers of personal property, and they were held
void.' But the courts have subsequently sanctioned "reasonable" restrictions
in light of the surrounding circumstances.7 The orthodox rationale for this
judicial view has been expressed by Chief Justice Holmes in the following
manner:
1 12 Fletcher, Corporations § 5453 (revised ed. 1957).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1372, added by 72 Stat. 1606 (1958).
3 For a case illustrating this problem see: Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208,
79 A. 2d 661 (1951).
4See, Boswell v. Buhl, 213 Pa. 450, 63 Atl. 56 (1906); Aiken v. Dickinson, 305 Pa. 176,
157 Atl. 471 (1931).
5 For discussions on this subject see: P.L.E., Corporations § 142 (1958); 12 Fletcher, Cor-
porations §§ 5452-5461 (revised ed. 1957); Ballantine, Corporations § 337 (revised ed. 1946);
O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 773 (1952); and Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corpora-
tion, 37 Va. L. Rev. 229 (1951).
6 Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 At. 1127 (1896); Brightwell v. Mallory,
10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 196 (1836); Barnard v. Desautels, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 19 K.B. 114 (1909).
7Garvin's Estate, 335 Pa. 542, 6 A. 2d 796 (1939); Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63
N.E. 934 (1902); Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 743, 152 At. 723 (1930);
and Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 198 Okl. 667, 181 P. 2d 1007 (1947).
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"Stock in a corporation is not merely property. It also creates a personal
relation analogous otherwise than technically to a partnership. . . . There
seems to be no greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's asso-
ciates in a corporation than in a firm."8
The basic restrictive plans are:
(1) "consent restraints" requiring the stockholders' or the board of
directors' unanimous approval before a stock transfer can be made, or the
consent of a stipulated percentage of either group;
(2) "first option" provisions, sometimes referred to as "first refusals",
whereby a holder or his personal representative before transferring in any
manner must first offer to sell his stock to the other stockholders or the
corporation;1" and,
(3) "buy and sell agreements" between a stockholder and the remain-
ing shareholders or the corporation." The parties enter into an agreement
binding the stockholder to sell and obligating the other contracting party to
buy the former's stock upon the happening of a stipulated event.
In addition, numerous variations or combinations of these plans are often
utilized to fulfill the needs of individual situations. But before selecting an
appropriate plan, the practitioner must ascertain which restrictions conform to
the court's test of "reasonableness".
Despite the fact that consent restraints have the advantage of excluding
undesirable outsiders without tying up the funds of either the corporation or the
shareholders staying in the enterprise, one Pennsylvania lower court has held
them void because "the effect of this agreement is to put the stockholder's power
to sell his stock in the hands of and make it dependent upon the will of others."
The court went on to say:
"In the . . Reading Terminal Railroad case, an agreement in which
it was stipulated that no sale of stock should be made by any stockholder with-
out the action of a majority of the signers thereof was declared void. If an
S Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 477, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902).
9 See, White v. Ryan, 15 Pa. County Ct. 170 (1894); Miller v. Farmer's Mill & Elevator
Co., 78 Neb. 441, 110 N.W. 995 (1907); and Douglas v. Amrora Daily News Co., 160 Il. App.
506 (1911).
10 See, Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909); Feldstein's Estate,
25 Pa. Dist. 602 (1916); and Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y. Supp.
873 (1919).
"1See, Wan v. Blum, 309 Pa. 551, 161 At. 596 (1933); and Halkias v. Liberty Laundry
Co., 361 Pa. 475, 64 A. 2d 800 (1949).
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agreement requiring only a majority of stockholders to assent to the sale is
void, clearly one requiring unanimous consent must be void." 12
On the other hand, first option "I and buy and sell agreements " have been
received favorably by the Pennsylvania courts. In Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay,"' the
court ruled that:
"Each subscribing stockholder acquired a preferred right by way of option,
to purchase the shares of the other if they died or withdrew from the business
first. This is a mutual and sufficient consideration to make a binding contract.
• . . Nor is the objection that the agreement is in restraint of alienation suffi-
cient. Such agreements are quite common among partners as to their shares
in the firm's assets and are enforced by courts without hesitation. No reason
of overruling public policy is apparent why they should not also be sustained
in relation to shares of stock in what is really only a private trading company." 16
Since neither first option provisions nor buy and sell agreements are invalid,
selection of one or of a combination of the two will depend upon the incorpora-
tor's reasons for imposing such restraints as well as the circumstances of each
individual case. First option provisions, seemingly the most widely used, can be
framed to include all possible situations of stock transfers; whereas, buy and
sell agreements are usually, by choice, limited to stock acquisitions when a holder
dies, possibly because the parties feel they should not be compelled to buy stock
due to a holder's voluntary act. Another reason for so limiting buy and sell
arrangements is that some individual business situations seem to dispel the likeli-
hood that sales or transfers will be contemplated 'by a stockholder during his
lifetime; consequently, it is only necessary to provide for purchasing his stock
when death occurs. Still other situations will warrant a coupling of both the
first option and the -buy and sell arrangement into one restriction, the former
covering sales and transfers during a shareholder's life and the latter covering
stock disposition at death. This combination has an advantage over a strict first
option in that it is more likely to assure the deceased's estate a fair price for the
stock. Where the existing stockholders are the only prospective purchasers in
a closely held corporation the advantage is obvious beyond comment.
Assuming that a first option provision will be selected in one form or an-
other, it should be drafted with precision, for the interpretation of restrictive
12White v. Ryan, 15 Pa. County Ct. 170, 177-178 (1894). Contra, Farmer's Mercantile
& Supply Co. v. Laun, 146 Wis. 252, 131 N.W. 366 (1911); Longyear v. Hardman, 219 Mass.
405, 106 N.E. 1012 (1914); and Wright v. Iredell Telephone Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E.
744 (1921).
's Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 At. 488 (1903); Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn
Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909); and Feldstein's Estate, 25 Pa. Dist. 602 (1916).
14Wand v. Blum, 309 Pa. 551, 164 At. 596 (1933); and Halkias v. Liberty Laundry Co.,
361 Pa. 475, 64 A. 2d 800 (1949).
15 205 Pa. 79, 54 Atl. 488 (1903).
161d. at 80, 54 Atl. at 489.
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provisions, rather than their validity has given rise to most litigation. Draftsman
of such agreements should be mindful that restrictions, though not generally
invalidated by consideration of public policy, are regarded with disfavor and
will be strictly construed,1" and the courts tend to recognize only the incorpora-
tor's desire to keep outside parties from purchasing the stock. No other reasons
for the restriction are recognized unless they are explicitly stated.18 It should
also be noted that at least one jurisdiction has held seemingly clear restrictions
so vague as to be undeserving of specific performance. "
In view of this, the first option provision should, among other things, recite
what occurrence will create the option. Parties may desire options to arise in
any or all of the following events: voluntary sales or transfers, dispositions by
will, sales by one shareholder to another, pledges, seizure and sales by legal
process and other transfers by operation of the law. In any event those situations
intended to be included should be clearly and specifically set forth in the re-
striction.
Voluntary sales are usually covered by even the most poorly penned restric-
tions. Likewise, there is no problem where a testator bequeaths his shares to a
third person, since his personal representatives will be bound to perform the
agreement under ordinary contract principles.2" Nevertheless, it is advisable
to specifically bind the holder's personal representative by appropriate words in
the restriction in order to discourage unnecessary litigation.
The courts are not willing to enforce a restriction against a sale by one
stockholder to another unless the agreement expressly includes such a transac-
tion.21 The reason for this is that it is assumed that the general restrictive pur-
pose is to thwart outside intrusions, and a sale by one shareholder to another does
not violate that purpose. In an agreement designed to preserve the proportional
holding, the contemplated offer to stockholders in proportion to their present
holdings should be clearly defined. Moreover, unless a provision restricts "trans-
fers" and not "sales" alone, a stockholder will be permitted to pledge his stock,
17Trilling & Montague, 140 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1956); and McDonald v. Farly &
Loetscher Mfg. Co., 226 Iowa 53, 283 N.W. 261 (1939).
18 Boswell v. Buhl, 213 Pa. 450, 63 At. 56 (1906); Garvin's Estate, 335 Pa. 542, 6 A. 2d
796 (1939); and Serota v. Serota, 168 Misc. 27, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 68 (1938).
19 Hardin v. Rosenthal, 213 Ga. 319, 98 S.E. 2d 901 (1957). The restrictive agreement in
this case provided that in the event a holder desired to sell any of his shares he should first offer
them to the existing stockholders at market value or true value. The option was to remain open
for a six-month period. It was further provided that the option could only be waived by a
writing, and that the restriction was to be printed on all stock certificates.
20 Garvin's Estate, 335 Pa. 542, 6 A. 2d 796 (1939).
21 Serota v. Serota, 168 Misc. 27, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 68 (1938); and Guaranty Laundry Co. v.
Pulliam, 198 Okl. 667, 181 P. 2d 1007 (1947).
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although the pledgee is usually required to give the other parties an opportunity
to purchase before foreclosure.2"
It should be noted with particularity that restrictive stock agreements apply
only to voluntary transfers and not to judicial sales or other transfers by opera-
tion of law unless, from the terms of the agreement, a converse conclusion is
clearly inescapable."2 An explanation given for this view is that a restrictive
stock agreement is analogous to restrictions on the assignability of property
leases which have always been strictly construed.24 In Trilling and Montague 25
the court set forth another explanation by reiterating the rule of construction
that restrictions are intended solely to protect the corporation from unwelcome
members. This being the case, the problem is merely one of price, since there is
no possibility of a secret sale without notice. All the stockholder must do is be
present and be the highest bidder at the sale. Although the rule that stock
restrictions do not apply to judicial sales seems to be firmly established, the
draftsman might do well to expressly cover judicial sales and other transfers
by operation of law in a restrictive stock agreement. A court confronted with
such explicit language might find that the restriction inescapably embraces such
situations and give effect to the true intention of the parties. In those jurisdic-
tions where such a restriction is contrary to statutes requiring like property to be
sold at public auction to the highest bidder express coverage of judicial sale
will be of no avail-such a restriction can never be valid.26
It is equally advisable to clearly identify the optionees and state their rela-
tive rights. If the shareholders are named optionees, the agreement should state
whether:
(1) each is entitled to purchase in accordance with the ratio between
his holdings and those of all shareholders having options on the shares
offered;
(2) each party is entitled to acquire equal parts of the offered shares
despite his existing holdings; or
(3) any shareholder is privileged to exercise the option on a "first
come, first served basis."
The draftsman should not overlook drafting a provision for the disposition
of stock that an optionee declines to buy. Should any other holder be free to
2 2 Monotype Composition Co., Inc. v. Kierman, 319 Mass. 546, 66 N.E. 2d 565 (1946); and
Estate Funds, Inc. v. Burton-Fifth Ave. Corp., 111 N.Y.S. 2d 596 (1952).
23 Barrows v. National Rubber Co., 12 R.I. 173 (1878); McDonald v. Farly & Loetscher
Mfg. Co., 226 Iowa 53, 283 N.W. 261 (1939); and Trilling & Montague, 140 F. Supp. 260
(E.D. Pa. 1956).
24 McDonald v. Farly & Loetscher Mfg. Co., 226 Iowa 53, 283 N.W. 261 (1939).
25 140 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
26 Barrows v. National Rubber Co., 12 R.I. 173 (1878).
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purchase or should it be offered pro rata to the accepting oderees? If the cor-
poration is named optionee it is important to state whether the stocks purchased
are to be retired, held as treasury shares, issued as stock dividends, or sold to
an acceptable purchaser.
In addition to listing occurrences which give rise to the option, a good
option agreement will provide the procedure for accomplishing the desired
objective. For example, it will recite when the option is to begin, and state
whether the offeror or his representative must give written or oral notice to the
offeree, or whether the offer arises automatically on the happening of the speci-
fied event. An illustration of what can happen when this is overlooked is pro-
vided by Dearden v. Dearden."7 In this case a stockholder filed a bill in equity
to compel another holder to specifically perform a contract in which it was
agreed that upon his son's death the defendant "must offer" his shares to the
petitioner within 60 days. The Court found that the option arose automatically.
There was no need for such an offer since "the agreement was self-executing and
the condition precedent having been fulfilled, Edward Dearden did, for a period
of 60 days after the death of his son, offer to sell the stock in question. This
option to purchase the stock, not having been accepted by the person to whom
it was given, expired at the end of the sixty days [following the death of the
decedent]." 29
Equally important is the inclusion of a clause stating the period within
which the optionee may exercise the option, and the length of time the parties
have to effectuate the transfer and pay the purchase price. With relation to the
option's time limit, sufficient time should be given to the corporation as optionee
in order that a meeting of the directors can be called to decide whether the option
will be accepted. Ample time must, likewise, be given to the shareholder-
optionees, so that it will be possible for them to arrange the financing.
A method or formula fixing the price of shares offered ought to be agreed
upon and stated in the restrictive agreement.2" This will preclude future dis-
putes, since it is easier to -establish an acceptable formula while the buyers and
seller are unknown. The price may be one based on "net worth", ° "par
value","' "book value" " or that which a bona-fide purchaser would pay if the
27 360 Pa. 225, 61 A. 2d 348 (1948).
28 Id. at 226, 61 A. 2d at 349.
29 For a discussion of this topic see: Forester, Valuing a Business Interest for the Purpose
of a Purchase and Sales Agreement, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 325 (1952); and O'Neal, supra note 5.
30 Mowry v. McWherter, 365 Pa. 232, 74 A. 2d 154 (1950).
31 Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909).
32 Garvin's Estate, 335 Pa. 542, 6 A. 2d 796 (1939); and Chrisman v. Avil's Inc., 80 Pa.
D.&C. 395 (1952).
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offer were extended to him." The latter device, however, seems to beg the ques-
tion-since such a clause is synonymous with a "reasonable price", and like the
failure to state any price or formula, is likely to result in litigation. Perhaps
the most popular method is to establish a fixed price amendable periodically.
(usually every six months and never longer than one year) in accordance with
business changes, and providing for arbitration if an agreement cannot be
reached. 4 If book value is used it is advisable to fix its calculation at the end
of the last preceding fiscal or calendar year or some other designated fiscal period
rather than upon the happening of the specified event. This will avoid the costly
procedure of a special audit.
There is in addition to the above mentioned difficulties of drafting restric-
tive clauses one problem inherent to both first options and buy and sell agree-
ments. This problem is the uncertainty of available funds when a purchase is
to be consummated. This uncertainty is the prime factor for adopting a first
option rather than a buy and sell agreement. This problem of available funds
also comes into play when determining the parties to an agreement. Pennsyl-
vania law permits corporations to purchase their stock only out of unrestricted
and unreserved earned surplus or unrestricted capital surplus " which may not
be available when the time comes; therefore, preference in many cases is given
to stockholders by operation of a mandatory corporate default. Obviously, strict
buy and sell agreements should be used only when the prospective buyer is rela-
tively certain that the purchase price will be on hand when needed.
One solution to the problem is the combination of business insurance with
the restrictive stock agreement. 6  The close corporation insurance agreement
is a written contract, either among the stockholders individually, and known
as the stock purchase plan, or between the corporation and its stockholders, and
known as the stock redemption plan. Under the stock purchase agreement, each
stockholder carries insurance on the life of every other stockholder in an amount
sufficient to underwrite his obligation to purchase the insured's stocks. The
buyer agrees to purchase that portion of stock the deceased owns which repre-
sents the ratio of shares held by such survivor to those owned by all the survivors.
Thus if A, B and C are sole stockholders in the corporation, and they own 100,
200 and 300 shares respectively, upon the death of C, A would agree to purchase
100 shares and B would agree to purchase 200 shares. Assuming that each share
is worth $100, A would insure C's life for $10,000 and B would insure C's life
3 Aiken v. Dickinson, 305 Pa. 176, 157 Atl. 471 (1931); and Trilling & Montague, 140
F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
a, Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 At. 488 (1903).
35 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-701 (1957).
36 For discussions on this subject see: Phillips, Life Insurance Trusts: A Recapitulation for
the Draftsman, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 408 (1933); and Comment, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1194 (1941).
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for $20,000. It is obvious that stock purchase agreements can become an ex-
tremely complicated network of cross options and insurance contracts if there
is a sizable number of stockholders. To illustrate, an agreement among seven
stockholders would require forty-two insurance policies. For this reason, stock
redemption plans are generally preferable to stock purchase arrangements in
such a situation. Under this agreement, the corporation insures the life of each
stockholder to the extent the valuation of his shares or a portion thereof. Thus
an agreement involving seven shareholders would call for 7 policies rather
than 42.
Many times business insurance may be coupled with the use of a trustee to
assure the performance of the buy and sell agreement. 7 By this device the
trustee is named beneficiary of the insurance policies while the stockholders
assign their shares to him endorsed in blank without surrendering their rights
as shareholders. Upon death, the trustee transfers the deceased's stock to the
surviving shareholders or to the corporation, and the purchase price is paid to
the executor of the decedent's estate in accordance with the agreement.
There are several detriments in using 'business insurance. For example,
every time a stock transfer is consummated a new agreement must be drafted,
or a shareholder might be uninsurable. In the latter situation there is no com-
pletely satisfactory solution, although an annual premium retirement annuity
contract is frequently used. This arrangement builds up a reserve which is im-
proved with interest over a period of years. One other disadvantage of both
stock purchase and stock redemption insurance plans is that premiums may be
prohibitively expensive.
If business insurance or a strict buy and sell agreement is used, a clause
should provide for termination of the agreement upon the corporation's bank-
ruptcy or dissolution. A provision should be inserted allowing a shareholder
after disposing of all his shares or the termination of the agreement to purchase
any insurance policy on his life by paying an amount equal to its cash surrender
value computed as of the date such right is exercised. The agreement also
should terminate upon the death of two or more holders occurring either simul-
taneously or successively in a close time sequence. Otherwise, although one
representative can compel the remaining parties to purchase his shares, he in
turn will be required to buy some of the other estate's holdings-an undesirable
dilemma.
Although the drafting of a restriction which will best bring about the
desired goal is often tedious and difficult the problem does not end here; for
37 See, Greater New York Carpet House, Inc. v. Herschman, 258 App. Div. 649, 17 N.Y.S.
2d 483 (1940), holding such an agreement valid because the corporation bargained to pay the
insurance premiums.
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the draftsman will next have to decide whether the agreement will be placed
in the articles of incorporation, the by-laws, a restrictive stock agreement or a
combination of two or more." "Generally, commentators suggest that the re-
striction be included both in shareholders' agreements and in the articles of
incorporation." 11 This conclusion has been reached because some jurisdictions
refuse to validate restrictions appearing in the 'by-laws on the basis that stock
restrictions are not within the purview of by-laws. ' True, many state statutes
provide that the corporation shall "make by-laws not inconsistent with existing
law, for the management of its property, the regulation of its affairs, and the
transfer of its stock," but courts often hold that such authorization refers only to
the procedural aspect of making stock transfers on the corporation books. 1
Moreover, it has been affirmatively asserted, in supporting the charter as an
effective instrument wherein the restrictions can be set out, that when the Secre-
tary of State approves the articles of incorporation, he thereby gives the state's
consent to the restrictions set forth therein; hence, parties other than the state
will not ordinarily at a later date successfully assail the restriction as being
unreasonable and contrary to the public policy of the state. 2 At least, the courts
might be rather hesitant to reverse the secretary's decision. The advocates of
charter restrictions have also reminded their readers that courts have held that
the charter represents not only a contract between the corporation and the state,
but also a contractual relationship between the stockholders and the corpora-
tion.'3 One court has held such a provision requires the unanimous consent of
all the stockholders in order to be amended.' Whether or not the rule is sound,
in most jurisdictions it would seem wise to include the restriction in the articles
of incorporation. Although some of the jurisdictions have held void by-laws to
constitute a valid contract,'" it seems unwise to rely on this mere possibility.
In Pennsylvania a contrary view is taken, and the courts will not strike down
reasonable restrictions appearing in the by-laws." In Garrett v. Philadelphia
38 For a general discussion of this subject see: 12 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 5; O'Neal,
supra note 5; and Cataldo, supra note 5. For a collection of cases on this subject see: Annot.,
65 A.L.R. 1159 (1930); 138 A.L.R. 773 (1942); and 61 A.L.R. 2d 1318 (1958).
39 12 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 5, at 224.
40 Driscold v. West Bradley & C. Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y. 96 (1874); Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust
& Savings Co. v. Home Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447, 24 S.W. 129 (1893); Ireland v. Globe Mill
Co., 21 R.I. 9, 41 At. 258 (1898); and Kritzer v. Cole Bros. Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App.
99, 181 S.W. 1066 (1916).
41 Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Mach. Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 256, 80 At. 1026 (1913); and
Kritzer v. Cole Bros. Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S.W. 1066 (1916).
42Cataldo, supra note 5.
43 12 Fletcher, Corporations § 5453 (revised ed. 1957); see also, Lawson v. Household Finance
Corp., 17 Del. 343; 152 At. 723 (1930).
44Johnson v. Tribute-Herald Co., 155 Ga. 204, 116 S.E. 810 (1923).
45 Weiland v. Hogan, 177 Mich. 626, 143 N.W. 599 (1913); and Model Clothing House
v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N.W. 957 (1920).
46Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909); and Elliott v. Lind-
quist, 356 Pa. 385, 52 A. 2d 180 (1947).
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Lawn Mower Co."7 the court held a restriction binding not merely as a by-law,
but also as an agreement between the parties, where they all assented to the
adoption of the regulations and agreed thereto before incorporation. As a
necessary corollary to this conclusion, the six year statute of limitation will apply
to claims of an alleged breach of the contract.4" Accordingly, such a by-law
regulation is governed by contract rules, and contractual parties cannot ignore
their covenant with impunity and still seek to hold the others to it.4" Equally
logical is the conclusion that by-laws adopted inconsistently with a prior stock
agreement constitutes a modification of the original contract."0 And finally, the
Supreme Court in 1951, presented with a stockholder's attempt to amend a stock
restriction in the by-laws by a majority vote, was of the opinion that:
"Provisions in corporate by-laws may, generally speaking, be divided into
two classes (a) those that are mere regulations governing the conduct of the
internal affairs of the corporation. These may be repealed, altered or amended
at the will of the majority unless a greater vote is required by the by-laws them-
selves or by statute. (b) Provisions in the nature of a contract which are
evidently designed to vest property rights inter se among all stockholders.
These cannot be repealed or changed without the consent of the other parties
whose rights are affected." 51
In light of this interpretation, the objections against inserting stock restric-
tions into by-laws raised in other jurisdictions are completely removed in Penn-
sylvania. In addition, there are practical reasons for preferring by-law to charter
restrictions. Although there is no case authority on the subject, the Pennsylvania
Business Corporation Law authorizes "any provision not inconsistent with law
which the incorporators may choose to insert for the regulation of the internal
affairs of the corporation and the business of the corporation" to be inserted
in the articles of incorporation,2 Literally construed this would appear to au-
thorize the inclusion of restrictive stock provisions in the articles of incorpora-
tion. But statutes of other jurisdictions having similar language pertaining to
by-law content have been so construed that restrictive stock provisions are said
to be outside the purview of such statutes and therefore the inclusion of such
restrictions are not authorized. " It is suggested that the Pennsylvania courts
might reach the same result in regard to articles of incorporation by applying
the reasoning of those courts.
47 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909).
4 8 Elliott v. Lindquist, 356 Pa. 385, 52 A. 2d 180 (1947).
4 Ibid.
5o Halkias v. Liberty Laundry Co., 361 Pa. 475, 64 A. 2d 800 (1949).
51 Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 213, 79 A. 2d 661, 663 (1951).
52 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-204 (1957).
58 See note 41 supra.
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Perhaps even more convincing is the argument that the Secretary of State
might question stock restrictions which do not fall within the orthodox type
familiar to him. Assuming that a drafted restriction provides for protection
in all possible situations, it is likely to be unorthodox. Why then invite a possi-
ble dispute when restrictions can be so easily effected by inserting them in the
by-laws? Therefore, if the stockholders agree on a first option or buy and sell
agreement its inclusion in the by-laws should be sufficient. However, where the
agreement is complicated, as for example when coupled with business insurance
to fund a buy and sell agreement, a separate stock agreement should also be
entered into spelling out in detail the exact intentions of the parties.
It seems then that there are three steps to creating an effective restrictive
stock agreement. First, the objects or results desired must be determined;
secondly, the method through which these objectives are to be obtained must be
set forth; and finally, the instrument or instruments which incorporate the agree-
ment must be carefully chosen. The foregoing merely points out some of the
common but not obvious problems which are often overlooked. It is believed
that proper consideration of and deliberation on these problems will enable the
practitioner to draft effective agreements. There are, however, two further stat-
utory requirements that should be considered. First, the restriction must be
placed on each stock certificate in order to effectively bind a purchaser not a
party to the agreement;54 and second, pre-emptive rights on the issuance of
additional shares must be provided for in the articles of incorporation.5 This
latter requirement is extremely important since proportionate shareholdings
could as readily be disturbed by issuing additional shares as by transferring exist-
ing shares unless appropriate restraints are imposed, and because it has been held
that by-law restrictions apply only to issued stock.5
ARTHUR E. SAYLOR.
5 4 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, §8-204 (1953). Even actual knowledge on the part of the pur-
chaser is insufficient if the words of restriction or the existence of the restriction with a reference
to the place in which it may be found do not appear conspicuously on the security.
55 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-611 (1933).
56 Chrisman v. Avil's Inc., 80 D.&C. 395 (1952).
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